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THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1990: FURTHER 
DEFINING THE RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF ARTISTS AND REAL 
PROPERTY OWNERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1937, the Rutgers Presbyterian Church in Manhattan 
invited painters·to enter a competition to design and paint a 
mural on the rear wall of the church and unanimously selected the 
designs and sketches of artist Alfred D. Crimi. l After the mural 
was completed, some parishioners objected to the painting feeling 
that "a portrayal of Christ with so much of his chest bare placed 
more emphasis on His physical attributes than on His spiritual 
qualities."2 The objections evidently grew louder, for in 1946 the 
mural was painted over without the artist being notified.3 
Crimi sued to compel the church to remove the overpaint, 
or in the alternative, to have the fresco returned to him.4 He 
based his suit on the doctrine of droit moral,6 which recognizes 
a legally protectible interest in the physical integrity of a 
work of art even after it is sold. The court was unable to find 
any American authority for the doctrine and ruled against 
him, rationalizing that if Crimi desired to retain rights in his 
work, he should have done so in the contract.s 
In 1980, the Bank of Tokyo decided to remove from the 
lobby of its Wall Street branch a massive sculpture by the well-
1. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813-14 (Sup. Ct. 
1949). 
2. Id. at 815. 
3. Id. Forty years later, Crimi recalled the experience: "I cannot describe the 
trauma that gradually overtook me. 1 could not believe that it was possible, iIi the 
twentieth century, that such a bestial mentality existed." Levy, Artists' Moral Rights: 
Will Federal Legislation Have any Real Impact in Deterring the Mutilation and 
Destruction of Artworks?, 11 L.A. LAw. 11 (Mar. 1988). 
4. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S. 2d at 815. 
5. See generally, Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HAsTINGS L.J. 
1023 (1976) and Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors aryl Creators, 53 HARVARD L. REV. 554 (1940) for a more complete discussion 
of droit ,poral. 
6. Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
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known American artist, Isamu Noguchi. In order to remove the 
sculpture, the Bank had to cut it into pieces, effectively 
destroying it.? Again, the artist was not notified. Noguchi felt 
the Bank's action was "vandalism," but he was left with no legal 
recourse; he had transferred all his property rights in the 
sculpture to the Bank.8 
These two examples illustrate the competing interests of 
artists and real property owners when artwork is incoporated 
into buildings. While eleven states have enacted legislation 
creating moral rights for artists,9 until recently there was no 
federal law addressing the issue. The Visual Artists Rights Act 
of 1990,10 which became effective June 1, 1991,11 creates federal 
moral rights for artists l2 and contains provisions specifically 
covering artwork incorporated into buildings. 13 This article 
will begin with a brief overview ofVARA and a detailed analysis 
of the provisions covering artwork incorporated into buildings. 
The focus of the article will address the many problems 
concerning the rights and duties of artists and real property 
owners under VARA, and will propose solutions to these 
problems that will best serve the interests of both. 
II. THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
VARA preserves the right of attribution and integrity for 
works of visual art. I. The right of attribution allows artists to 
7. Gleuck, Bank Cuts Up Noguchi Sculpture and Stores It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 
1980, § I, at I, col. 4. 
8. Id. 
9. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 980-990 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 42-116s to 42-116t (West 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:2151-51:2156 (West 1987); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27 § 303 (West 1988); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 85S (West 
Supp. 1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598.970-.978 (1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:24A-l to 
2A:24- 8 (West 1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 56-11-1 to 56-11-3 (Michie 1986); N.Y. Arts· 
& Cult. Aff. Law §§ 11.01-16.01 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73 §§ 
2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 5-62-2 to 5-62-6 (Michie 1987). 
10. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101- 650, Title IV, 104 S.tat. 
5089, 5128 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. 
1991) [hereinafter VARA]. 
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A [Note (a)] (Supp. 1991) which states that the Act will take 
effect six months after the date of the enactment of the Act, which was Dec. I, 1990. 
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1991). 
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. 1991). 
14. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 106A (Supp. 1991). Under V ARA, "a work of 
visual art" covers paintings, drawings, prints, SCUlptures and still photographic images 
produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy or in a limited edition 
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. The 
Act specifically excludes motion pictures and other audiovisual work, as well as such 
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claim authorship of their work, or to prevent the use of their 
name as the author of a work which they did not create.16 
This right also allows an artist to prevent the use of his or 
her name as the author of a work in the event the work is 
distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in such a way that 
would be prejudicial to the artist's reputation. IS 
The right of integrity allows the artist to prevent any 
intentional distortion, mutilation or other modification of the 
work that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or 
reputation. 17 It also allows the artist to prevent any intentional 
or grossly negligent destruction of a work of recognized quality.18 
These rights vest only in the author of the work, and exist for 
the lifetime of the author.19 VARA also provides that these rights 
exist apart from any copyright in the work, and transfer of 
copyright will not affect the rights conferred by VARA.20 The 
rights may not be transferred, but may be waived if the author 
expressly agrees to such a waiver in a signed written instrument.21 
B. REMOVAL OF WORKS OF VISUAL ART FROM BUILDINGS 
VARA amends section 113 of the Copyright Act to afford 
protection to artists whose works of art are incorporated into 
buildings. 22 This section provides different prophylactic 
measures depending on whether the work of art can be removed 
without alteration or destruction.1S 
If a work of art has been incorporated into a building in such 
a way that its removal would cause "destruction, distortion, 
mutilation or other modification"2. of the work, then the rights 
things as maps, charts, technical drawings and applied art. All merchandising, 
advertising and promotional items are also excluded. Any work made for hire or other 
work not subject to copyright is also excluded. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1991). 
15. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. 1991) (Rights of Attribution and 
Integrity). 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2)(Supp. 1991). 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1991). 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b) (Scope and Exercise of Rights) & 106A(d) (Duration of 
Rights) (Supp. 1991). 
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (Supp. 1991). 
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. 1991). 
22. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (Supp. 1991) (Removal ofWorka of Visual Art 
from Buildings). 
23. [d. 
24. Hereinafter, the word "alteration" will be used to encompass the cumbersome 
statutory language "destruction, distortion, mutilation or other modification." 
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of integrity and attribution will apply unless expressly waived 
by the artist. 26 The artist will be deemed to have waived the 
rights if he or she consented to the installation of the work 
before June 1, 1991, or executed a written waiver on or after 
June 1, 1991.26 The written waiver must specify that the 
installation of the work may subject it to alteration by reason 
of its removal, and must be signed by both the artist and the 
building owner.27 
If the building owner wishes to remove a work of art that 
can be removed without alteration, the rights of integrity and 
attribution will apply unless the owner makes a diligent, good 
faith attempt, without success, to notify the artist of the 
intended action.28 The artist will also lose his or her rights if 
the building owner successfully notifies the artist, but the 
artist fails within 90 days after receiving the notice either to 
remove the work or pay for its removal,29 If the artist does pay 
for the removal of the work, title to that work will vest in the 
artist.30 
The following analysis will attempt to define further the 
rights and duties and real property owners under amended 
section 113. The analysis will focus on five areas: (1) consent 
and related contractual issues; (2) burdens of proof and setting 
a standard for determining whether a work of art can be 
removed without alteration; (3) the problem of works made for 
hire; (4) notification issues; and (5) possible problems posed by 
the doctrine of aesthetic nuisance. 
III. FURTHER DEFINING RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER 
VARA 
A. CONSENT AND RELATED CONTRACTUAL ISSUES 
If an artist consents to have his work incorporated into a 
building in such a manner that its removal would cause 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(AHB) (Supp. 1991). 
26. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(I)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
27.Id. 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1991). VARA provides that the Register of 
Copyrights shall establish a registry system whereby the artist of a work that has been 
incorporated into a building may record his or her identity and address with the 
Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 113(dX3). V ARA further states that a building owner shall 
be presumed to have made a good faith attempt to notify if the owner sent notice to 
the artist's most recent address recorded with the Register. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B). 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
30.Id. 
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alteration of the work, the artist's rights of integrity and 
attribution will not apply.31 Because VARA specifically requires 
a written instrument signed by both the artist and the property 
owner to effect consent,32 it is manifest that an oral consent 
shall not be binding. The statutory language also requires that 
the written consent specify that the installation of the work 
may subject it to alteration in the event of removal, not just that 
the work may be installed.33 It is imperative that courts strictly 
scrutinize an apparent consent by the artist and must not 
imply consent by the artist in an ordinary contract to install 
a work of art in or on a building. 
The precise scope of consent and its binding effect are 
somewhat ambiguous under VARA. The written consent is to 
be signed by both the artist and the property owner, implying 
that these are the only parties bound by the agreement. 
However, perhaps significantly, the statutory language 
preserving to the artist the rights of integrity and attribution 
does not specify that the artist may prevent only the owner of 
the work of art from destroying or altering it. Instead, VARA 
broadly provides that the "author of a work of visual art shall 
have the right ... to prevent any intentional distortion, 
mutilation or other modification ... [and] to prevent any 
destruction of a work of recognized stature .... "34 
This language implies that the artist may prevent anyone 
from harming his or her work. VARA provides that in the 
event of written consent, the rights of integrity and attribution 
"shall not apply."36 Does this mean that if the artist consents 
to installation of a work in a building , he or she loses all 
rights in the work? If this is the case, parties other than the 
property owner may be free to alter or destroy the work. If 
Crimi had consented to installation of his work under VARA, 
the angry parishoners may have been free to paint over his 
fresco. 36 Presumably the property owner, as owner of the work 
of art, would have a cause of action against the harming third 
31. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
33. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1991) reads in pertinent part: "[the] written 
instrument [must specify] that installation of the work may subject the work to 
[alteration], by reason of its removal .... " 
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. 1991). 
35. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
36. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
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party under common law notions of property law,s7 but if the 
owner declined to pursue a cause of action, the artist may be 
left without any personal legal redress. This ambiguity could 
be easily resolved by amending the section to read that if 
consent is given by the artist, the rights of integrity and 
attribution "shall not apply only as against all owners of the 
property and their successors in interest." This added clause 
would serve to limit the scope of the artist's consent to allow 
only the property owner and his or her successors in interest 
to alter the work of art, and preserve in the artist a cause of 
action against any tenant or other member of the public who 
destroys or alters the work. 
Another ambiguity arises in subsections (d)(1)(B) and (d)(2) 
of section 113. Consent by the artist will waive all rights, but 
the statute does not specify that the rights will be waived 
only in the event of an actual removal of the work of art. This 
would seem to be the intended effect of the legislation,38 but as 
worded, the statute would allow an owner who has received 
consent from an artist to freely alter the work of art even 
though the owner may never intend to remove it. Specifically, 
under subsection (d)(2), the owner of the building could wish 
to remove the work,s9 change his mind, and then be free to alter 
the work with impunity. By specifying that consent by the 
artist will only waive the artist's rights in the event of an 
actual removal, the statute would achive its intended effect. 
Limiting the scope of consent in the above manner would 
have several beneficial effects. If artists understand that their 
consent will have a limited effect, they will be more likely to 
give consent. Because consent will be more freely given by 
artists, more property owners may be encouraged to incorporate 
works of art into their buildings, and artists and the public as 
a whole will benefit. 
37. The common law action of "trespass on the case- provides a damage remedy 
for indirect or consequential injury to real or personal property resulting from a 
wrongful act, intentional or negligent, of the defendant. See O. BROWDER, R. 
CUNNINGHAM, G. NELSON, W. STOEBUCK AND D. WHITMAN, BASIC PROPERTY LAw at 22, 
(5th ed. 1989). Actions may also be held under various state vandalism laws. See, e.g., 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (West Supp. 1992) which provides in pertinent part: "Every 
person who maliciously (1) defaces with paint or any other liquid, (2) damages or (3) 
destroys any real or personal property not his own ... is guilty of vandalism: 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1991) provides that the written instrument 
effecting consent must specify that installation of the work may subject it to aiteration 
"by reason of its removar (emphasis added). Section 113(d)(2) begins "[i]fthe owner 
of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art . ... - (emphasis added). 
39. See supra note 38. 
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B. BURDENS OF PROOF 
1. The Problem 
In an ideal situation, the artist and the property owner 
would sit down at the bargaining table dealing at arms length, 
each fully informed and each in an equal position of bargaining 
power. Unfortunately, this idyllic scene is not reality. The 
reality is that few artists and property owners will be aware 
ofVARA and the various protections it offers. Because of this 
reality, one can easily imagine the following scenario taking 
place: 
A property owner owns a building into which a work of art 
has been incorporated. The property owner is losing money on 
the building, and wants to tear it down in order to make more 
efficient use of the land. In the course of destroying the 
building, the work of art is also destroyed without the artist 
being notified. The artist finds out that the work has been 
destroyed, and seeks the advice of an attorney. The attorney 
conducts the necessary research, and informs the artist of the 
rights under VARA. An action is brought with the artist 
claiming that the work of art could not have been removed 
without destroying the work, and since the property owner did 
not get a written consent from the artist, the artist's rights of 
integrity were still in force and therefore, the property owner 
is liable for damages.4o The property owner will claim that 
the work of art could have been removed without destruction, 
and since the artist did not register with the Registry and 
therefore could not be located, the artist is not entitled to 
damages. But because the artwork has been destroyed, it is 
impossible to determine whether the work of art could have 
been removed without alteration, so whomever has the burden 
of proof on that issue will lose. Unfortunately, VARA is silent 
with respect to burdens of proof. 
To place the entire burden of proof on either party in the 
above situation would seem inequitable. If the artist must 
prove that the work of art could not be removed without 
alteration, the artist would rarely be able to maintain a cause 
of action.41 On the other hand, if the property owner had to 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) provides for remedies and damages co· extensive with that 
of copyright under Title 17. except there will be no criminal offenses under VARA as 
under 17 U.S.C. § 506. 
41. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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prove that the work of art could be removed, the property 
owner would rarely be able to maintain a defense to an artist's 
cause of action. Instead, a practical standard is needed for 
determining whether a work of art can be removed from a 
building without alteration. 
2. A Standard For Determining Whether a Work of Art Can 
Be Removed Without Destruction 
With today's modern painting techniques, experts in the 
field believe most works of art can be removed without 
harm;2 but in some cases the cost may be prohibitive.43 If a 
work could be removed, but only with considerable expense, 
then it may be said that the work can be removed without 
alteration and the artist would lose his or her rights if the 
property owner is unable to locate him or her in good faith. 
If the artist is notified, he or she will likely be unable to 
afford the cost of removing the work without destroying it. 
On the other hand, there are certain works of art that will 
clearly be unremovable without alteration,'· and to prevent 
the property owner from tearing down a building just because 
a work of art is incorporated into the building is equally 
unfair. 
42. See Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art 
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 885 n.81 
(1981). Most modern murals are made from water-base paints which roll off easily, and 
thus could be removed without harm to the work. Older techniques used oil-base paints 
on wet or dry plaster. ld. (citing an interview with art historian Carl Baldwin, New 
York City (Nov. 1979». 
43. See Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 S.D.L.REV. 675, 717 (1982). In 
discussing the California Art Preservation Act, which contains a provision similiar to 
VARA § 604, Karlen says: MIn many instsnces, if the owner expended a fortune in hiring 
experts and workmen to delicately remove works of art which were difficult to excise, 
then it would be said that the owner could remove without substantial damage. ~ Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
44. See, e.g., Crimi, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814. The method of fresco painting was 
described by Crimi as follows: 
Fresco painting is done on wet plaster. The color adheres to 
the plaster through chemical action-the union of carbonic 
acid gas and lime oxide producing carbonate of lime as the 
water evaporates on the surface of the plaster. In fresco, no 
binding agent need be mixed with the pigment as in other 
painting processes; the pigments are simply well ground in 
water and applied to the wet surface. As the plaster dries, the 
color is actually incorporated in the plaster and-if the work 
is properly executed-the painting is assured a permanence 
surpassing that achieved in any other method of wall 
decoration.ld. 
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To rectify this problem, courts must imply a reasonable cost 
requirement when interpreting these provisions.46 The cost 
to remove a work should not be limited to the mere expense 
involved in removing it, but should also allow consideration of 
other factors. In determining whether the cost to remove a work 
of art without destroying it is reasonable, courts should 
examine two important factors: (1) the importance of the 
property owner's intended action affecting the work of art; 
and (2) the value of the work of art in relation to the value of 
the property and the expense required to remove the work. If 
this standard is applied faithfully, allocating the burden of proof 
can be done with less harsh results. 
The artist would make a prima facie case of a violation of 
rights under VARA merely by proving that the work has 
been altered. The property owner can then defend by showing 
that the importance of the action that caused the work to be 
destroyed outweighed the value of the work of art. Destruction 
of a building because of substantial monetary loss, 
neighborhood revitalization, or condemnation would be 
actions that would be deemed important. The case would 
then fall under sub-section (d)(2) and the property owner 
would only have to prove he or she made a good faith attempt 
to notify the artist without success, or that the artist was 
notified, and failed to remove the work within 90 days. 
Presumably, if the property owner wished to remove the 
work merely because he or she found it distasteful, the 
property owner's action affecting the work would not be 
deemed important. The case would then fall under sub-
section (d)(l), and the property owner would be liable for 
damages unless he or she was able to obtain a written consent 
from the artist. 
If a reasonable cost requirement is applied, it should further 
clarify the intent of the legislature that these two sections be 
mutually exclusive. Allocating a burden of proof can be done 
without harsh results, more artwork can be preserved for the 
community, and property owners will not be prevented from 
taking necessary actions with their property. 
45. See Petrovich, Artists' Statutory Droit Moral in California: A Critical 
Appraisal, 15 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 29 (1981) for a similiar suggestion in interpreting The 
California Art Preservation Act. 
9
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C. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 
Significantly, "works made for hire"'& are excluded from 
protection under VARA. Because many works of art 
incorporated in buildings may be specially ordered or 
commissioned, this exclusion may seem to create a large 
loophole in VARA: VARA purports to protect works of art 
incorporated into buildings, but if such a work is found to be 
a "work made for hire," it will lose protection. 
A recent unanimous decision by the Supreme Court resolved 
the conflict in lower courts'7 over the proper construction of the 
"work made for hire" provision of the Revised Copyright Act. 
In Community Center for Non-Violence v. Reid,'s the Court 
clarified the standard for determining whether a work qualifies 
as a "work made for hire." The Court first stated that Congress 
intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for a work to 
qualify as a "work made for hire": one for employees working in 
the scope of employment and the other for specially ordered or 
commissioned works created by independent contractors.49 The 
Court then stated that since nine specific classes of works were 
enumerated in the second clause of the "work made for hire" 
definition,60 only those classes of works could qualify as a "work 
Id. 
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1990) which provides in pertinent part: 
A 'work made for hire' is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional 
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, 
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument 
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work 
made for hire .... 
47. The Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits had adopted variations of an 
"actual control" test to determine whether a party is an employeo for the purposes of 
the "work made for hire" provision. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. 
Schock·Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. 
Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). The 
Fifth Circuit had applied a common law agency test, see, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v. 
Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit had ruled that only formal salaried employees met the 
definition. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). 
48. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
49. ld. at 747·8. 
50. See supra note 46. 
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made for hire" if created by an independent contractor.61 The 
Court held that courts shall apply the common law of agency to 
determine whether an author of a work was an employee or an 
independent contractor.62 In applying the common law of agency 
test, the Court analyzed a number of factors including: the 
hiring party's right to control the project; the skill required of the 
free-lancer; the source of the tools used to create the work; the 
location where the work was done; the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; the hiring party's right to 
assign additional projects; and the method of payment. 63 
Few artists creating works to be incorporated into buildings 
will be working as an employee of the building owner, rather, 
most will be working as independent contractors. Therefore, 
they will only lose protection under VARA if their work falls into 
one of the nine specific classes and the parties have signed a 
written instrument specifying that the work is a "work made 
for hire."64 It is very unlikely an artist's work will fall into any 
of the nine specified classes.66 Effectively then, the only way 
such a work may lose protection is upon a court finding that the 
artist was an employee of the property owner (or any other 
party directing control over the artist). This is also unlikely, as 
illustrated by the Reid case.66 
51. Reid, 490 U.S. at 748. 
52. [d. at 751. 
53. [d. at 751. The Court also considered the extent of the hired party's discretion 
over when and how long to work, the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants, 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party, whether the hiring 
party is in business, the provision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the 
hired party. [d. at 751-52. 
54. See supra note 46. 
55. The nine specified classes are: (1) a contribution to a collective work; (2) a part 
of a moton picture or other audiovisual work; (3) a translation; (4) a supplementary 
work; (5) a compilation; (6) an instructional text; (7) a test; (8) answer material for a 
test; and (9) an atlas. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). A ·collective work" is defined as ·a work, 
such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of 
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole." [d. A compilation is defined as "a work formed by 
the collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes 
an original work of authorship." [d. The term ·compilation" includes collective works. 
[d. A ·supplementary work" is defined as "a work prepared for publication as a 
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducting, 
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use 
of the other work ... ." [d. 
56 In that case, a sculptor, James Reid, was hired to sculpt a nativity scene, with 
a homeless family as the subject, for CCNY. Reid, 490 U.S. at 730. In analyzing 
Reid's status in this relationship, the Court applied the agency test in the following 
manner: CCNY asserted control over the project; Reid was practicing a skilled 
occupation using his own tools; Reid did the work in his own studio; Reid was hired 
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Although the Court in Reid decided the work for hire issue, 
they remanded the case to the district court to decide whether 
Reid's sculpture could be considered a work of joint 
authorship.57 The case was settled before the district court 
passed on the issue.68 
VARA provides that in the case of a joint work prepared by 
two or more authors, anyone of the authors may waive all 
rights for all authors.59 This is significant because all joint 
authors may not agree on whether to waive rights and if an 
artist and a property owner were found to be joint authors, their 
interests may be in opposition. 
The Copyright Act defines a joint work as "a work prepared 
by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole."80 One commentator describes the 
terms "inseparable" and "interdependent" as follows: 
[I]f author B's contribution, when combined 
with author A's contribution results in 
recasting, transforming or adapting Ns 
contribution, then the two contributions 
may be said to be inseparable. If the process 
is simply one of assembling into a collective 
whole Ns and B's respective contributions, 
without thereby recasting Ns contribution, 
then the two contributions may be said to be 
in terdependen t. 81 
only for this one project; CCNY had no rights to assign additional projects; Reid was 
retained for two months; and payment was conditioned on completion of the statue. 
Id. at 752-53. In analyzing the rest of the factors, see supra note 53, the Court found 
apart from the deadline, Reid had absolute freedom in deciding when and how long 
to work, Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants, creating sculptures 
was hardly a regular business for CCNY, in fact CCNY was not a business at all, and 
finally, CCNY did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee 
benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds. 
Id. at 753. Weighing these factors, the Court concluded that all of them, except the 
assertion of control by CCNY, weighed -heavily against finding an employee 
relationship," and Reid could not be considered an employee ofCCNV. Id. 
57. Id. at 753. 
58. Interview with Thomas Goetzl, Professor of Law at Golden Gate University 
School of Law, in San Francisco (Apr. 1991). 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. 1991) (Transfer and Waiver). 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1991). 
61. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.04 at 6-11 (1989). 
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It is clear that if an artist wants to preserve his or her 
rights, the artist must be careful not to allow the property 
owner to assert too much control over the work. This will 
rarely be an issue. Realistically, a property owner will rarely 
assert any control over the project, let alone enough to 
transform the work into a "joint work." To avoid having an 
artist's creation become a "work made for hire," the artist 
should, if possible, work in his or her own studio. The contract 
to create the work should specify that payment will be made 
upon completion of the work, and if the property owner wants 
the artist to create several works, each work should be covered 
by a separate contract. In addition, the artist should read the 
contract carefully and should not sign any contract that 
specifies that the work will be treated as a "work made for hire" 
unless that is the artist's intent. To prevent a work from 
becoming a "joint work," the artist must simply preserve 
artistic control over the project in the contract. 
D. NOTIFICATION OF THE ARTIST 
Under section 113(d)(2), if a work of art can be removed from 
a building without harm, the artist's rights will apply unless 
the property owner has made a good faith attempt, without 
success to notify the artist, or has notified the artist and the 
artist failed within ninety days to remove the work or pay for 
its removal. 62 Artists should· be encouraged to record their 
identity and address with the Register of Copyrights as 
provided in VARA. This will allow the artist to be notified 
easily in case the property owner wishes to remove the work, 
and will allow the artist to preserve the work if he or she so 
desires. 
Assume, however, that an artist has not registered his or her 
name and address, and cannot be located by the property owner, 
or that after being notified, the artist declines to remove the 
work. In these cases, the property owner is free to dispose of the 
work in any manner. VARA assumes that the artist's interest in 
preserving the work is the only interest at work in this situation. 
This may not be the case. The public as a whole, as well as 
many art or landmark preservation groups also have a strong 
interest in seeing works of art preserved for the community. 63 
62. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1991). 
63. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 989(a) (West Supp. 1992) where the legislature finds 
and declares that "there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and 
artistic creations." 
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With these interests in mind, VARA should be amended to 
allow public or private non-profit organizations an opportunity 
to pay for the removal and preservation of a work incorporated 
in a building if the artist cannot be notified, or if the artist after 
receiving notice, fails to remove the work.M In either of these 
two situations, assuming a property owner desires to remove 
the work of art in such a manner that it will be destroyed, the 
property owner, before taking such action, should be required 
to publish notice of the intended action in a public newspaper. 
Any organization wishing to preserve the work of art would 
then be required to notify the property owner of its intentions, 
and would be allowed a period of ninety days after the 
publication date during which to pay for the removal of the 
work. If the organization should fail within ninety days to 
remove the work, the property owner would then be allowed to 
remove the work in any manner desired. If an organization 
agrees to remove the work, and pays for its removal, title to the 
64. This proposal is modelled on Cal. Civ. Code § 989 (West Supp. 
1992)(Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations). That section reads in pertinent 
part: 
(e) Removal from Real property. (1) If a work of fine art cannot 
be removed from real property without substantial physical 
defacement ... no action ... may be brought under this section. 
However, if an organization offers some evidence giving rise to a 
reasonable likelihood that a work of art can be removed ... without 
substantial physical defacement ... and is prepared to pay the cost 
of removal of the work, it may bring a legal action for determination 
of this issue. In that action, the organization shall be entitled to 
injunctive relief to preserve the integrity of the work of fine art, but 
shall also have the burden of proof .... 
(2) If the owner of the real property wishes to remove a work 
of fine art which is part of the real property, but which can be 
removed from the real property without substantial harm to such 
fine art, and in the course of or after removal, the owner intends 
to cause or allow the fine art to suffer from physical defacement 
... the owner shall do the following: 
(A) If the artist ... fails to take action to remove the work of 
fine art after [being notified], the owner shall provide 30 days' notice 
of his or her intended action affecting the work of art. The written 
notice shall be a display advertisement in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the area where the fine art is located .... 
(i) If within the 30-day period an organization agrees to 
remove the work of art and pay the cost of removal of the work, the 
payment and removal shall occur within 90 days of the first day of 
the 30-day notice. 
(ii) If the work is removed at the expense of an organization, 
title to the fine art shall pass to that organization. 
(iii) If an organization does not agree to remove the work of 
fine art within the 30-day period or fails to remove and pay the cost 
of removal of the work of fine art within the 90-day period the owner 
may take the intended action affecting the work of fine art. . 
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work would pass to the organization. The organization should 
then be required to preserve the work of art for the community, 
either by displaying the work itself, or by donating the work to 
a museum, preferably one in the same area that the work of art 
was orginally located. 
This amendment would fully recognize all the interests at 
work in this situation. The property owner would still be 
allowed to remove the work if no one agreed to pay for its 
removal, and one can hardly imagine that the property owner 
has any preference as to whether an artist or a non-profit 
organization actually pays to remove the work. The owner 
would still be able to rely on a ninety day period to remove a 
work. If the artist fails to remove, either because the artist 
cannot afford to pay the removal costs, because the artist no 
longer has any interest in preserving the work, or because 
the artist simply cannot be located, instead of automatic 
destruction of the work, there is a chance that it may be 
preserved for the public. 
E. THE POSSIBLE PROBLEM OF AESTHETIC NUISANCE 
Courts display a decided reluctance to recognize nuisance 
actions based on notions of aesthetics.66 Courts have been 
reluctant to delve into this area, usually reasoning that there 
are no objective standards by which to judge matters of taste" 
or that an unaesthetic use of land does not constitute a 
substantial invasion of interests in surrounding property 
owners in the use and enjoyment of their land.67 There are, 
65. See generally Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional 
Judicial Attitudes, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 141 (1987) for an excellent analysis of the doctrine 
in general as well as an analysis of how the doctrine has traditionally been interpreted 
by courts. 
66. See, e.g., Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1983). -Aesthetic 
considerations are frought with subjectivity. One man's pleasure may be another man's 
perturbation, and vice versa. What is aesthetically pleasing to one may totally 
displease another- 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder.' Judicial forage into such an 
area would be chaotic .... This court has no inclination to knowingly infuse the law 
with such rampant uncertainty." [d. at 2. Cf. Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 124 A.2d 
54 (N.J. App. Div. 1956), where the court upheld larger lot-size zoning requirements 
in a predominantly low-income municipality. The court stated -[i]t is no longer to be 
doubted that [community attractiveness] is an appropriate consideration within the 
statutory criterion of the 'general welfare.'" [d. at 64. 
67. See, e.g., B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Investment Co., 451 A.2d 879 (D.C. 
App. 1982). In an action by B & W to enjoin a nearby landowner from operating a 
surface parking lot alleging the lot constituted a private nuisance because it damaged 
the aesthetics of the neighborhood, the court disposed of the claim in one sentence:-B 
& W's claim for damage to 'the aesthetics of the area' based on neighborhood 'blight' 
does not amount to an assertion ofthe substantial interference with B & W's use and 
enjoyment of its land required to sustain a private nuisance action." [d. at 883. 
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however, several recent decisions that indicate a possible 
change in attitude toward this doctrine.68 
The few cases that have upheld actions for aesthetic 
nuisance have done so for such things as keeping wrecked 
automobiles on a private lot,69 and an unsightly accumulation 
of debris. 70 Whether an offensive or unsightly work of art 
placed on, or incorporated in, a building could ever rise to the 
level of aesthetic nuisance is questionable at best, but given the 
recent decisions upholding use of the doctrine,71 one cannot rule 
out the possibility. It is certainly feasible, under traditional 
nuisance law, that the wall of a building on which a work of art 
was placed could deteriorate to such a point that it posed a 
danger to passers-by.72 
Whether an action in such a situation is based on notions 
of aesthetic or traditional nuisance, the success of such an 
action would place the property owner in a bizarre Catch-22 
under VARA. Assume a successful nuisance action is brought 
against a property owner in which the court requires the 
owner to tear down or repair the offending or dilapidated 
work. Assume also that the artist that created the work had not 
signed a written consent, and the artist's rights of integrity 
were still in force. It may be difficult for the property owner to 
remove the work, or repair the building, in such a way that the 
work was altered or modified without violating the artist's 
right of integrity. Significantly, however, VARA provides that 
the modification of a work which is the result of conservation 
68. See, e.g., Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d 37 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1975), where the plainifTs 
asked the court to determine that a fence erected by their neighbors between the 
plaintiff's property and a beach constituted a nuisance because of its unsightliness. 
The court observed in dictum "[a]lthough there is authority to the contrary, we begin 
with the assumption that in the appropriate case recovery will be permitted under the 
law of nuisance for an interference with visual aesthetic sensibilities." Id at 39. See 
also Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1982), where the Virginia Supreme 
Court upheld a chancellor's decree enjoining defendants from keeping wrecked 
automobiles on their lot, accepting the chancellor's notion that unsightliness alone can 
form the basis of a nuisance action. Id. at 190-91; Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791 (Colo. 
App. 1984), holding that a legitimate but unsightly activity may constitute a private 
nuisance.ld. at 794. 
69. Foley, supra note 67. 
70. Allison, supra note 67. 
71. See supra note 67. 
72. But see 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (Supp. 1991) (Exceptions) which provides 
that the modification of a work of art that is the result of passage of time or the inherent 
nature of the materials is not an alteration, and therefore, not a violation of the artist's 
rights conferred by the Act. 
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is not a violation of the artist's rights, unless the modification 
is caused by gross negligence.73 Presumably then, a property 
owner could repair a dilapidated building in such a way that 
the artwork is also restored without violating any rights of the 
artist. 
It is clear then, that in the event of a successful nuisance 
action against the property owner requiring the owner to take 
action that would violate an artist's rights under the Act, that 
the artist must be required to waive his rights. The property 
owner should, however, make every effort to preserve the 
work, or should attempt to notify the artist and allow the 
artist the opportunity to preserve the work. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 presents an admirable 
effort on the part of Congress to fashion moral rights for 
artists on a federal level. The specific provision covering works 
of art incorporated in buildings is an equally laudable attemp.t 
to deal with the interests of artists and property owners that 
often come into conflict. Because VARA is still in its seminal 
stages, it is impossible to predict how courts will interpret its 
various provisions, and harder still to predict how effectively 
VARA will address the often competing interests of property 
owners and artists. 
The provision ofVARA covering works of art incorporated 
in buidings as it currently reads does not completely address 
all possible issues that may arise. If the interpretations 
suggested in this article are followed by courts, VARA will 
more effectively achieve its purpose. Congress must pay close 
attention to how courts are interpreting VARA, and appropriate 
amendments must be made in the event that VARA is not 
being applied as envisioned. If this is done, artists in the 
United States may finally receive the much needed rights 
they deserve without impinging on the equally important 
rights of property owners. 
Matthew A. Goodin* 
73. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (Supp 1991). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992 
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